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THE FATE AND INFLUENCE OF JOHN STUART MILL'S 
PROPOSED SCIENCE OF ETHOLOGY 
BY DAVID E. LEARY* 
The years between 1840 and 1940 constituted an important period in the 
history of the human sciences. During this period, under the impulse of 
cataclysmic social events and the inspiration of rapid development in the 
physical and biological sciences, the previously existing "moral sciences" 
underwent radical development, and other new human sciences were pro- 
posed and formulated for the first time. In the early part of this crucial period 
in the history of the modern human sciences, few works were as important 
as John Stuart Mill's System of Logic (1843), which culminated in the well- 
known Book VI, entitled "On the Logic of the Moral Sciences."1 This 
work attempted to bring rigorous thinking to the human sciences, especially 
as regards methods and standards of proof. It was both an indication of, and 
an influence upon, the developing self-consciousness with which 
nineteenth-century investigators sought to bring human affairs within the 
purview of strictly scientific procedures. Going through numerous 
editions-eight in Mill's own lifetime-the work was a best seller for the rest 
of the nineteenth century. 
No matter what the impact of the work as a whole, however, and of Book 
VI in particular, its central proposal regarding the development of a science 
of human character seems to have been virtually ignored, and thus Mill's 
plea for a science of Ethology, as he called it, seems to have been one of the 
many nineteenth-century proposals which did not pass the test of history. 
This paper is an attempt to answer the question, whatever became of Mill's 
Ethology? This will not be an entirely antiquarian question if in answering it 
we can detect an important influence on the development of the human 
sciences. And indeed it is the thesis of this paper that we can locate such an 
influence. 
* I would like to thank Professor George W. Stocking, Jr., for posing the initial 
question regarding the fate of J. S. Mill's Ethology and for commenting on various 
drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to Professor Robert J. Richards for comment- 
ing on one draft of this paper and to the University of New Hampshire for granting 
me a Summer Faculty Fellowship while I worked on this and other historical re- 
search. A version of this paper was presented at the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the 
International Society for the History of the Behavioral and Social Sciences 
(Cheiron), Akron, Ohio, 8-10 June 1979. 
1 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 2 vols., repr. 
of 8th rev. ed. (1872), in Collected Works, ed. J. M. Robson, 18 vols. to date (To- 
ronto, 1963- ), vols. VII-VIII (1973-74). In Mill's time the term "moral sciences" 
referred to all the sciences dealing with the mental, behavioral, and social aspects of 
human life. 
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I. Mill's Program and Its Initial Failure 
In Chapter 5 of Book VI in his Logic, Mill argued that there was a great 
need for a "science of the formation of character." This science, which he 
termed Ethology, would be the science of human nature which Psychology 
itself could not provide. According to his suggested division of labor, 
Psychology would be the science for discovering the universal laws of mind, 
whereas Ethology would be the science entrusted with the task of explaining 
particular individual minds, or characters, according to the general laws 
provided by Psychology. Ethology too would have its laws, but they would 
be derivative; that is, they would be deduced from the universal laws of 
Psychology. 
In Mill's view, any individual character, or the collective character of 
any group of people, must be explained in terms of the application of univer- 
sal laws to particular circumstances. The reason people differ is not that they 
operate according to different principles. The principles-for Mill, the laws 
of association-are the same for all; but differences arise from the cir- 
cumstances in which people find themselves. Ethology is the science which 
seeks to explain the practical, or circumstantial, application of the general 
laws of mind. Being a true science, its laws are necessarily universal. But its 
applications to individual cases will never be exact for the simple reason that 
we can never fully determine all the factors which have entered into a given 
person's life history. The goal which Mill proposed, therefore, was that 
Ethology be developed to a point where the best possible predictions could 
be made regarding the "tendencies" which different characters would ex- 
hibit in certain circumstances. Only when this was done could the moral and 
social sciences be developed to any degree of theoretical and practical 
utility. 
Mill's proposed science of Ethology was well known since his Logic was 
widely read for decades, but though the Logic went through a number of 
editions in which various parts were changed, the section on Ethology was 
never essentially modified or further developed. His own attempt to develop 
a science of Ethology was never made. As he wrote to Alexander Bain in late 
1843, "I do not know when I shall be ripe for beginning 'Ethology.' The 
scheme has not assumed any definite shape with me yet."2 In fact, as Bain 
reports, Mill's scheme "never came to anything; and he seems shortly to 
have dropped thinking of it." 3 And with this failure to develop an Ethology, 
Mill had also to give up his hope of writing a work on Sociology because he 
was convinced that "there is no chance, for [a science of] Social Statics at 
least, until the laws of human character are better treated."4 Since the 
development of Sociology had been a major goal of Mill's, we can-only 
conclude that he met with insuperable difficulties in trying to develop his 
Ethology. 
2 John Stuart Mill, The Early Letters of John Stuart Mill, ed. Francis E. Mineka 
(1963), in Collected Works, VIII, 617. 
3 Alexander Bain, John Stuart Mill: A Criticism with Personal Recollections 
(London, 1882), 78. 
4 Mill, Early Letters, op. cit., 613. 
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It is not too difficult to pinpoint some of the specific problems that Mill 
encountered. For one thing, the possibility of a deductive science of Ethol- 
ogy depended upon the prior existence of an apodictic, systematic Psychol- 
ogy. In his Logic Mill had been very confident about the existence of such a 
science. We may reasonably assume that Mill soon discovered how unrea- 
sonably sanguine that opinion was. Secondly, not only was Mill overly con- 
fident about the state of certainty which Psychology could offer, but beyond 
that he had in mind a grossly inadequate Psychology; his brand of as- 
sociationism was in its last days. His own protege, Alexander Bain, whom 
he soon acknowledged as his superior in psychological matters, was instru- 
mental in bringing about the transformation of Psychology in Britain from an 
introspective to a biological science. Whereas Mill thought of psychological 
laws in terms of the interaction of ideas, Bain and the next generation be- 
came aware of the vast amount of recent research on the brain and nervous 
system and were beginning to realize the need to integrate this new knowl- 
edge into the science of Psychology. And with the advent of the age of 
Darwin, psychological thinking was increasingly done not only by employing 
biological metaphors but also by utilizing biological factors. These develop- 
ments were in marked contrast to Mill's approach in the Logic, in which 
organismic factors played a very negligible role.5 Mill's psychology was 
excessively intellectualistic. He spoke of the laws of mind, whereas any 
viable science of character, as Gordon Allport has pointed out, must "ac- 
count for the galaxy of human interests, motives, conflicts, and passions 
which are the essential forces in the formation of character." 6 
Finally, Mill's proposed methodology proved to be impracticable. A de- 
ductive science which also claimed to deal with the empirical events of 
everyday life was simply impossible. Even if an adequate Psychology had 
been in existence, it is difficult to imagine how one could simply deduce a 
science of human character. One's deductions would always have to be 
made with an eye on the type of human character to be explained. Mill 
himself recognized this fact and subsequently allowed for the necessity of 
arriving inductively at some kind of empirical propositions regarding the 
human character-types that were then to be explained deductively. 
Nevertheless his proposed methodology still depended too heavily upon 
deduction rather than upon empirical observation. 
In summary, then, the development of a science of character demanded a 
more systematic, more biological, more emotionally oriented, and more em- 
5 Mill's non-organismic approach is particularly noteworthy since he proposed his 
Ethology as an alternative to Phrenology, a discipline which admitted a biological 
assessment, and the possibility of an hereditarian explanation, of character. The fact 
that Mill, a political and social liberal committed to expeditious social change, fa- 
vored an environmentalist explanation of character is not surprising, but it does place 
his thought squarely within a tradition which was losing strength in mid-nineteenth 
century Britain. The place of Phrenology was soon taken by more reputable and 
lasting biological sciences. See Robert M. Young, Mind, Brain and Adaptation in the 
Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 1970). 
6 Gordon W. Allport, Personality: A Psychological Interpretation (New York, 
1937), 87. 
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pirical psychology. In addition to these four weaknesses in Mill's program, 
there were two other reasons why his program got so little initial response. 
One was that the first attempt to implement this program was a dismal 
failure, even according to its author, Alexander Bain.7 This failure was even 
more notable because Bain had supplied the needs of Mill's program by 
developing a more systematic, biological, and empirical psychology which 
gave particular attention to non-intellectual and specifically emotional fac- 
tors.8 Unfortunately, Bain, like Mill, presented his Ethology as an alterna- 
tive to Phrenology. In 1843, when Mill first proposed Ethology, it was rea- 
sonable to criticize Phrenology which was still near the peak of its popular- 
ity. But by 1861, when Bain published On the Study of Character, Including 
an Estimate of Phrenology, Mill's derogatory opinion of Phrenology was 
widely accepted, and there was no longer any need to argue the case of 
Ethology in relation to the success or failure of Phrenology. Therefore, when 
Bain devoted over one half of his book to an extended and detailed attack on 
Phrenology, it did little to make his work appealing or relevant. 
The final factor involved in the initial failure of Mill's Ethology was the 
turning of British social thought in the 1860s toward increasingly develop- 
mental concerns and away from the "Social Statics" which Mill had hoped 
to base upon his Ethology. Under the influence of evolutionism, ethnologists 
and anthropologists turned their attention to questions pertaining to the 
origins and historical development of different social groups. In addition, 
also influenced by the new mode of thought, they formulated their answers 
to these questions in terms of assumed differences in racial and physical 
factors rather than in terms of social learning, or character formation, which 
Mill espoused. Thus, Mill's program was not only impracticable as he de- 
signed it, and inadequate as Bain formulated it, it was also irrelevant to the 
concerns of the succeeding generation of social scientists.9 
7 Bain admitted the failure of his On the Study of Character, Including an Esti- 
mate of Phrenology (London, 1861) in his Autobiography (London, 1904), 260. 
8 Bain had developed his psychology in The Senses and the Intellect (London, 
1855) and The Emotions and the Will (London, 1859). 
9 The concerns of the post-Millian generation, as well as the correlative limita- 
tions of British social theory which constituted the general context of the initial 
failure of Mill's Ethology, have been investigated by J. W. Burrow, whose analysis 
develops the earlier insights of Noel Annan and, especially, Talcott Parsons. See J. 
W. Burrow, Evolution and Society: A Study of Victorian Social Theory (Cambridge, 
Eng., 1966); Noel Annan, The Curious Strength of Positivism in English Political 
Thought (London, 1959); and Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New 
York, 1937), esp. Part I. Also relevant is Reba N. Soffer, Ethics and Society in 
England: The Revolution in the Social Sciences, 1870-1914 (Berkeley, 1978). Leslie 
Stephen's treatment of Mill's thought in The English Utilitarians (3 vols. [London, 
1900], III) is equally enlightening. Finally, when I speak about the influence of 
"evolutionism" on ethnology and anthropology it should be clear that this influence 
was exerted by Lamarckian and Spencerian thought as much as, and in many cases 
more than, Darwinian thought. Indeed, it was Lamarckian thought that helped 
mediate between the environmentally "social" and the genetically "racial," whereas 
Spencer influenced evolutionary social thought well before Darwin proposed his 
theory in 1859. 
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II. A. F. Shand's Revision and Development of Ethology 
For thirty-five years after Bain's book there was much discussion about 
character and character formation in England, but the major part of this 
discussion was couched in moralistic, educational, and inspirational works 
on how to raise and train children. Although some of these works made 
reference to Mill's Ethology, none of them constituted a real attempt to de- 
velop Mill's program. Rather, these references were simply made in an 
attempt to gain respectability for the study of character at hand.10 In addition 
to these literary and educational treatises on character formation, an effort 
was made during this period to study character in a more scientific fashion. 
But again Mill's lead was not followed. Instead, it was Francis Galton who 
set the standard for the quantitatively-oriented anthropometric studies of 
these decades.11 
Such was not the case in France. There, where the works of Mill and 
Bain had been made known through the works of Hippolyte Taine and 
Theodule Ribot,12 I'ethologie was pursued in more or less conscious imita- 
tion of Mill's original program. I say "more or less" because there was 
criticism as well as enthusiasm for the science of character in France. Fur- 
thermore, France's literary tradition of studying le caractere, represented by 
La Bruyere,13 had a definite influence on the French ethological movement. 
Nonetheless, especially in response to the work of Ribot, a number of 
French authors in the 1890s devoted themselves to the study of character. 
The works which resulted were conscious attempts to develop a science of 
character along the general lines suggested by Mill. The leaders of this 
"school," whose ethological works eventually blended into the tradition of 
French medico-developmental psychology, were Frederic Paulhan, Alfred 
Fouillee, and Paulin Malapert.14 
10 E.g., cf. Alexander Stewart, Our Temperaments: Their Study and Their Teach- 
ing (London, 1887), 12. 
11 E.g., cf. Francis Galton, [Address to the Anthropological Section of the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science], Nature, 2 (1877), 344-47; and L. S. 
Hearnshaw, A Short History of British Psychology, 1840-1940 (New York, 1964), 
56-66. 
12 Hippolyte A. Taine, Histoire de la Litterature anglaise, 4 vols. (Paris, 1863-64); 
and Theodule Ribot, La Psychologie anglaise contemporaine (Paris, 1870). 
13 Jean de La Bruyere, Les Caracteres de Theophraste, Traduits du Grec: avec 
les Caracteres ou les Moeurs de ce Siecle (Paris, 1688), trans. Jean Stewart (Balti- 
more, 1970). 
14 The relevant works of Theodule Ribot are "Les bases affectives de la personna- 
lite," Revue philosophique, 18 (1884), 138-72; "Les bases intellectuelles de la per- 
sonnalit6," ibid., 410-66; "Sur les diverses formes du caractere," Revue 
philosophique, 34 (1892), 480-500; and "Les caracteres anormaux et morbides," 
Annee philosophique, 2 (1895), 1-17. The works of the French school of ethologists 
include Bernard Perez, Le Caractere de l'Enfant a l'Homme (Paris, 1892), Frederic 
Paulhan, Les Caracteres (Paris, 1893), Alfred Fouillee, Le Temperament et le Carac- 
tere (Paris, 1895), Frederic Queyrat, Les Caracteres et l'Education morale (Paris, 
1896), Albert Levy, La Psychologie du Caractere (Paris, 1896), Paulin Malapert, Les 
Elements du Caractere et leurs Lois de Combinaison (Paris, 1897), and Paulin 
Malapert, Le Caractere (Paris, 1902). 
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For the purposes of this paper, the major importance of these French 
writers is that they provided the tangible historical link between John Stuart 
Mill's proposal of Ethology in 1843 and Alexander F. Shand's revision and 
development of Ethology at the turn of the century. For it was through his 
reading of these French authors in the mid-1890s that Shand, an English 
gentleman-scholar, was inspired to assume the challenge of fulfilling Mill's 
program. The first major result of this inspiration was a seminal article 
published in 1896 in the journal Mind. In this article, entitled "Character and 
the Emotions," Shand presented a programmatic statement of the basic 
premises of his new Ethology.15 This statement-met with general approval, 
especially among Shand's friends, such as G. F. Stout, William McDougall, 
and Edward Westermarck. But Shand was such a perfectionist that he con- 
tinued revising the details of his argument and did not publish his book on 
The Foundations of Character until 1914.16 Even then he fully intended to 
revise and expand this work, but the war years intervened and he never got 
around to it in subsequent years. 
Shand made a number of changes in Mill's original program. Some of his 
changes were inspired by his reading of the French ethologists; for instance, 
Shand rejected excessive reliance on deduction and moved away from Mill's 
intellectualistic model of character. But so far as Shand was concerned the 
most important positive contribution of the French was the notion of organi- 
zation or system, which he utilized in rethinking the basic psychological foun- 
dation of character. For although the work of the French ethologists had 
persuaded him of the necessity of an emotionalistic model of character, he 
became convinced that the psychology of his time, including that of the 
French, provided no adequate theory of emotion. To develop a more 
adequate basis for his Ethology, Shand used the concept of organization or 
system to help him distinguish between emotions and sentiments. According 
to this distinction, which he based on both observation and speculation, 
emotions are the basic human tendencies, considered separately. 
Sentiments, on the other hand, are complex, organized systems of these 
basic tendencies. These sentiments, Shand maintained, form over time, as 
the originally independent emotions become patterned through experience 
into the basic systems of behavioral and cognitive tendencies. These sys- 
tems are the basis of character. Such is Shand's theory in a nutshell, al- 
though he worked it out in considerably greater detail. 
Shand was aware that further research might necessitate a revision of his 
theory of the sentiments; and he knew that his book did not offer the final 
word on character. In fact, he conceived his work, as its title indicates, as 
merely a "foundation" for the science of Ethology: it was only intended, he 
said, to be "a map or plan ... to guide us." Yet it turned out to be a very 
useful map. The theory of sentiments which he presented in his 1896 article 
drew immediate attention and was soon made widely known through its 
15 A. F. Shand, "Character and the Emotions," Mind, 5 (1896), 203-26. 
16 A. F. Shand, The Foundations of Character: Being a Study of the Tendencies 
of the Emotions and Sentiments (London, 1914). 
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adoption in G. F. Stout's popular textbook, A Manual of Psychology. 17 Then 
in 1903, Stout invited Shand, as the leading expert on the subject, to contrib- 
ute a chapter on the emotions to his Groundwork of Psychology.18 And in 
1908, William McDougall placed Shand's theory of sentiment at the center of 
his own theory of character and social behavior in his immensely influential 
Introduction to Social Psychology.19 The publication of Shand's book in 
1914 brought similar attention to his more fully developed theory of charac- 
ter. Then, as noted above, the war years interfered with normal activity. 
Although the demand was sufficient to warrant two later editions of the 
book, in 1920 and 1926, Shand never published his planned sequel. Yet G. F. 
Stout, writing in 1936, was still confident that Shand's general plan was 
"comprehensive, original, and capable of being worked out in detail." How- 
ever, he had to report that unfortunately "successors have not hitherto been 
found to carry forward the investigation which he began." Stout suggested 
that the reason for this was undoubtedly that "the interest of psychologists 
had been diverted into other channels." But he was certain that when "they 
do take up Shand's problem they will find that his book fulfills the promise of 
its title and supplies foundations on which they can build."20 
III. Shand's Ethology and the Conceptual 
Foundations of Social Anthropology 
Stout's final judgment seems overly optimistic today. Shand's work had 
already influenced psychologists and anthropologists before 1936, and it was 
never to do so again. But the nature of that previous influence was signifi- 
cant. As regards the psychological study of character, Shand affected the 
thinking of subsequent psychologists by his stress upon the emotive aspects 
of character. Allport, for instance, credits Shand with "his recognition of 
systematized emotional dispositions as the functional units of which the 
personality (or as he prefers to call it, the character) is composed."21 And as 
regards the anthropological study of social organization, Shand provided a 
theory of character which served as the psychological underpinning of the 
new social anthropology which arose in the third decade of the twentieth 
century. For in the 1920s, after sixty years of emphasis upon evolutionary 
and racial approaches to social arrangements, A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and 
Bronislaw Malinowski led a movement back toward a "Social Statics" 
which, as Mill had envisioned, was based upon the conception of character 
as a product of social learning and emotional ties rather than racial inheri- 
17 G. F. Stout, A Manual of Psychology, 2nd rev. ed. (London, 1901), Bk. 4, 
ch. 9. 
18 A. F. Shand, "The Sources of Tender Emotion," in G. F. Stout, The Groundwork 
of Psychology (London, 1903), ch. 16. 19 W. McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology (London, 1908), ch. 5. 
20 G. F. Stout, "Alexander Faulkner Shand (1858-1936)," Proceedings of the 
British Academy, 22 (1963), 403, 407. Stout's obituary (pp. 401-07) is the best extant 
biography of Shand. 
21 Allport, Personality, op. cit., 88-89. 
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tance and animal instinct. For both of them, Shand's ethological theory of 
character provided an important conceptual foundation. 
In 1906, ten years after Shand's article on character, Radcliffe-Brown 
began his original field work in the Andaman Islands. He completed it in 
1908, the year William McDougall, published his Introduction to Social 
Psychology, in which Shand's theory of sentiments played a central 
explanatory role. Radcliffe-Brown did not complete the writing and rewrit- 
ing of his monograph on The Andaman Islanders until 1914 (the same year in 
which Shand's book appeared), and it was not published until 1922.22 De- 
spite the delay, however, the central ideas in Radcliffe-Brown's book were 
still fresh and novel in the early 1920s. In fact, they signalled a new turn in 
British anthropological thought-away from the evolutionary and individual 
psychological approaches of Haddon and Rivers and toward a Durkheimian 
conception of society as an integrated system of institutions, customs, and 
beliefs.23 Radcliffe-Brown did not seek to understand this social system in 
terms of its developmental history, nor simply in terms of its dependence 
upon the fullfillment of some supposedly innate individual needs. Rather, he 
sought to understand the significance of social institutions, customs, and 
beliefs by first determining their contemporary meaning to the people them- 
selves and then by referring to their social effects. Finally, he attempted to 
understand the function of each institution, custom, and belief in relation to 
the entire system of institutions, customs, and beliefs. In working all this 
into a unified theory, Radcliffe-Brown relied heavily upon Shand's concept 
of character, or sentiment, as he found it expressed in McDougall's Intro- 
duction to Social Psychology.24 Thus, according to Radcliffe-Brown, the 
characters of the Andamanese-i.e., their customs and beliefs-were based 
upon the formation of certain sentiments; and these sentiments in turn were 
formed through the experience of customs and beliefs in childhood. Hence, 
the maintenance of social order was dependent upon the learning of particu- 
lar patterns of emotions constituting sentiments which in turn regulated the 
characteristic social behavior and beliefs of a given people. In this way, with 
Radcliffe-Brown's new approach to anthropology, Mill's hope of founding a 
science of "Social Statics" upon a science of human character, or Ethology, 
came to a belated fruition.25 
22 A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, The Andaman Islanders (Cambridge, Eng., 1922). 
23 For general background information regarding A. C. Haddon and W. H. R. 
Rivers, cf. T. K. Penniman, A Hundred Years ofAnthropology, 3d rev. ed. (London, 
1965). Regarding the Durkheimian conception of society, cf. Steven Lukes, Emile 
Durkheim: His Life and Work (New York, 1972). Since Durkheim was a very impor- 
tant influence on both Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski, and since Durkheim also 
stressed both system and sentiment, it is pertinent to wonder about the possibility of 
an intellectual tie between Durkheim, the French ethologists, and Shand. However, I 
have not been able to establish any positive relationship. 
24 Ibid., chs. 5 & 6. 
25 Incidentally, George Stocking has drawn my attention to the fact that, as a 
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At approximately the same time, Bronislaw Malinowski adopted Shand's 
concept of sentiment into his own developing system of thought. An admirer 
of both Shand and McDougall, Malinowski freely admitted his debt to Shand 
in his 1927 classic, Sex and Repression in Savage Society.26 Although his 
relation to Shand was clear even before this time, Sex and Repression re- 
vealed the full extent of his allegiance. As with Radcliffe-Brown, the theory 
of the sentiments provided the basic foundation of Malinowski's understand- 
ing of culture and society. As he wrote, "Mr. Shand's theory of sentiments 
will always remain of paramount importance for the sociologist, since social 
bonds as well as cultural values are sentiments standardized under the influ- 
ence of tradition and culture." Again, as with Radcliffe-Brown, there is the 
closed, reciprocal relation between sentiments and social arrangements. 
Sentiments are formed in certain social contexts; and certain social contexts 
are perpetuated by these related sentiments. The importance given to 
Shand's theory is indicated by the fact that Malinowski saw repressed sexual 
needs (a la psychoanalytic theory) as merely a special case subsumed under 
the rubric of sentiment. "We see, therefore," Malinowski concluded, "that 
the theory to which we must attach our results in order to put them on a 
sound theoretical basis is Shand's theory of the sentiments, and that instead 
of speaking of a 'nuclear complex' we should have to speak of the family 
sentiments, of kinship ties, typical of a given society."27 This is how 
Malinowski explained the customs and beliefs of the Trobriand Islanders in 
1927, near the beginning of a very productive career in anthropology. 
In the years ahead, Malinowski, like Radcliffe-Brown, would change 
idioms to a certain extent. As Radcliffe-Brown gradually spoke more of 
"interest" and "value," so Malinowski came to speak of "needs" and 
"satisfaction" rather than "sentiment."28 But the original conceptual 
framework is still clearly visible in their later works; and that framework, as 
we have seen, was at least partially the result of an intellectual tradition 
stretching from Mill and Bain, through the French ethologists, to Shand, 
through McDougall, to Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski. And from the 
tutelage of Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski came an entire generation of 
student, Radcliffe-Brown would have read Mill's proposal of Ethology in the Moral 
Sciences Tripos at Cambridge University. Thus, in addition to his knowledge of 
Shand's version of Ethology, he would have had direct access to the original Millian 
program. 
26 B. Malinowski, Sex and Repression in Savage Society (London, 1927), 175-78, 
240-42, 247-50, 259. 
27 Ibid., 177. 
28 E.g., A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, "On Social Structure" (1940), in Structure and 
Function in Primitive Society: Essays and Addresses (New York, 1952), 188-204; and 
B. Malinowski, "A Scientific Theory of Culture" (1941), in A Scientific Theory of 
Culture and Other Essays (Chapel Hill, 1944), 1-144. 
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anthropologists who by 1940 had firmly established the vigorous new field of 
social anthropology.29 
University of New Hampshire. 
29 Perhaps not so coincidentally, one of the important members of this generation, 
Gregory Bateson, suggested the term "Ethology" for the study of that central aspect 
of culture which has to do with the "standardized system of organization of the 
instincts and emotions of the individuals" of that culture (Naven [1936], 2d ed. 
[Stanford, 1958], 118, italics omitted). Although he was not certain, Bateson believed 
that his use of the term resulted from a conversation with Radcliffe-Brown in Sydney 
in 1928 (personal communication, 5 September 1978). Other uses of the term were 
also espoused in the early twentieth century. Thomas P. Bailey, Jr., argued for a 
multi-factor model of human character based upon Mill's program; see his Ethol- 
ogy: Standpoint, Method, Tentative Results (Berkeley, 1899) and Bibliographical Refer- 
ences in Ethology (Berkeley, 1899). In 1903 an Ethological Society was founded in 
London in order to promote the systematic study of human character. For over 
twenty-five years this society published The Ethological Journal which, despite the 
acknowledged inspiration of Mill, gave a heavy emphasis to phrenological studies 
and the goal of reinstating Gall's historical reputation and importance. From a totally 
different origin (namely, from the critical jargon for the mode of setting forth man- 
ners, customs, and mores in satirical comedy), William Graham Sumner borrowed 
the term "Ethology" for his study of folkways; see his Folkways (1906) (repr. New 
York, 1960), 47-49. Meanwhile the term was also being used by biologists at the turn 
of the century to cover what today falls under the heading of "ecology," and from 
1907 to 1940 the Zoological Record contained a section on Ethology, defined as the 
study of the behavior of different classes of animals. Later in this century the work of 
Konrad Lorenz, Niko Tinbergen, and others has established the latter type of Ethol- 
ogy as a separate branch of the biological sciences. This science of species-specific, 
instinctual animal behavior is quite different from the more environmentally oriented 
study of human character proposed by Mill and extended by Shand and social an- 
thropology. For an overview of this other tradition, see Julian Jaynes, "The Histori- 
cal Origins of 'Ethology' and 'Comparative Psychology'," Animal Behaviour, 71 
(1969), 601-606, and W. H. Thorpe, The Origins and Rise of Ethology (London, 
1979). So far as I can tell the two traditions have developed in isolation, but they may 
now be in the process of converging. Cf. Hilary Callan, Ethology and Society: To- 
wards an Anthropological View (Oxford, 1970) and Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology: 
The New Synthesis (Cambridge, Mass., 1975). 
